

Ethnic Fractionalization, Ethnic Polarization, and Potential Conflict in Parent Districts of IKN

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to determine the degree of ethnic fractionalization and polarization in the parent districts of the new Indonesian Capital of Nusantara (IKN), namely Kutai Kartanegara (Kukar) and North Penajam Paser (PPU) Districts, and assess the potential of ethnic conflict. The research involves quantitative analysis, where statistical formulas are used to calculate the ethnic fractionalization index (EFI) and ethnic polarization index (EPOI). The 2010 BPS population census, the most recent census based on ethnicity, is the primary data used for the core analysis. The study results reveal that both districts have a high level of ethnic diversity, with Kukar having a higher EFI than PPU (0.80 versus 0.75). However, PPU has a greater potential for conflict, as it has a higher EPOI (0.66) than Kukar (0.59-0.60). Considering the socio-political situation, the condition of ethnopolitics in Kukar is relatively conducive to providing support for the IKN development. In PPU, its ethnopolitical climate appears favorable for supporting the development of IKN. However, it

is crucial to pay due attention to the issue of indigenous Paser people in IKN, as they represent the third largest ethnic group in Rings 1 and 2 of the IKN areas.

1. INTRODUCTION

East Kalimantan is a province with a diverse population. While Dayak, Banjareseese, Buginese, Kutai, and Javanese ethnic groups have the largest populations, there are hundreds of other smaller ethnic groups in the region. Other provinces in Indonesia, like the Special Capital Region of Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Special Region of Yogyakarta, and East Java, are also home to people of different ethnicities. However, what sets East Kalimantan apart is the strength of ethnic solidarity expressed by its people. This makes the issue of ethnicity more prominent in this province. The expression of ethnic solidarity in East Kalimantan considerably causes frictions, ranging from ethnic tensions, and ethnic riots, to inter-ethnic conflicts (de Jonge & Nooteboom, 2006). Some examples are the conflict between the Dayak and the Buginese in West Kutai, the conflict between the Tidung ethnic group and the Buginese in Tarakan (when it was still part of East Kalimantan), the conflict between the Paser ethnic group and the Buginese in Penajam sub-district, as well as various ethnic frictions in various areas in East Kalimantan such as in Balikpapan, Samarinda, Paser, East Kutai, and Berau.

The Indonesian government, with the approval of the House of Representatives, has decided to relocate the Indonesian Capital from Jakarta to East Kalimantan through the promulgation of Law Number 3/2022 on the State Capital on 15 February 2022, which later be amended by Law Number 21/2023 on 3 October 2023. According to the new law, the Indonesian Capital of Nusantara (IKN) area in East Kalimantan covers 252,660 hectares, which is four times larger than Jakarta. However, it is important to note that this area falls administratively under the Kutai Kartanegara District (Kukar) and North Penajam Paser District (PPU). These two districts should not be ignored as they are the parent districts of the IKN area and are now close neighbors of IKN. As East Kalimantan has had several instances of ethnic conflicts in the past, the newly established IKN must be free from any such conflicts. It is also important to ensure that the neighboring districts of PPU and Kukar have favorable ethno-demographic and ethnopolitical conditions that can support the development of IKN. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate whether the ethno-demographic and ethnopolitical conditions of Kukar and PPU are suitable for the development of IKN.

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This is particularly important to be addressed as the PPU District has experienced ethnic tensions between the Buginese and Paser ethnic groups. In 2019, these tensions escalated into ethnic riots in the Ferry Port of Penajam sub-district. During the riots, 158 buildings and houses were burnt down, which affected 94 households and a total of 352 people. Additionally, 21 shops, two kiosks, 12 motorcycles, three cars, one small wooden boat, one ticket counter, and three small wooden bridges were also burned down. It is worth noting that both conflicting parties were Muslims, but one Islamic religious school was also burned down. Other non-material losses affected by riots were traumatic children and women (*Kompas*, 31/10/2019). In the Kukar District, however, no ethnic conflict was observed. Why did ethnic conflict occur in the PPU District while it didn't occur in the Kukar District? To find the answer, this research focuses on the structure of ethnicity in the region in the form of ethnic fractionalization and polarization. This is because ethnic polarization, in particular, is closely related to the potential for ethnic conflict. If the potential for ethnic conflict in these two parent districts is high, by all means, this will be inherited by IKN. Therefore, research on this matter is imperative. If the ethnic situation is vulnerable to the emergence of conflict, then preventive measures can be taken from the start. This study attempts to measure and analyze the ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization in PPU and Kukar. The two districts indeed contributed areas, along with their respective populations, to the IKN: PPU contributed 16 villages, while Kukar contributed 38 villages. In other words, the parent districts of the 54 villages that make up the IKN area are Kutai Kartanegara District and North Penajam Paser District. The role or contribution of the two parent districts is crucial in providing supporting capacity for IKN, including their demographic supporting capacity. If the ethno-demographic condition is conducive, it will certainly be able to expedite the development of IKN. Otherwise, preventive or mitigating efforts need to be pursued.

In the study of ethnic conflict, Snyder (2000) highlighted the aspect of ethnonationalism in the democratization process. In countries that have just gotten rid of authoritarianism and then hold democratic elections, competing elites often mobilize support using the issue of ethnocentrism. To preserve or expand their power, the winning elite often uses the primordial issue of ethnocentrism or ethnonationalism to achieve its narrow goals so that what Snyder observes, from voting to violence, becomes a general political phenomenon. This shows the crucial roles of primordial issues and the elite in the conflict. In this issue, Mariana Tepfenhart (2013) confirmed the role of belligerent leaders who use ethnic hatred to stage collective violence against other ethnic groups to achieve their political agenda. To make matters worse, in a state where power is divided along ethnic lines, conflict entrepreneurs quite often use suppressive actions of the state to eliminate or crush the other ethnic group (Warren & Troy, 2015). In further research, experts questioned such explanations of the causes of the conflict as in many ethnic conflicts the explanations are not satisfactory.

Collier and Hoeffler (2001) later tried to find the driving forces of the conflicts. In so doing, they highlight the motives for conflicts, some of which are ethnic conflicts. They propose greed and grievance explanations by focusing on the greed of conflict entrepreneurs and the exploitation of people's grievances. From a quantitative analysis study of 161 countries, Collier and Hoeffler found that greed outperforms grievance on causes of conflict. Their work was much discussed by experts, creating the so-called greed-grievance model in explaining the conflict. Some experts used the greed-grievance model to explain the conflict, meaning that they agreed with Collier and Hoeffler's argument (Dunne & Tian, 2019). Other experts emphasize the grievance factor only in the conflict (Denny & Walter, 2014; Dowd, 2015; Hoth & Mengal, 2016). Other analysts disagreed. Laurie Nathan (2005), for instance, harshly criticized Collier and Hoeffler's work and argued that Collier and Hoeffler's research is questionable in using the chosen proxy variables/indicators so the results and conclusions are therefore questionable. Others were dissatisfied with the dichotomic explanation and proposed the model to be revised. Anthony Vinci (2006), for instance, said that the primary motivation of survival is one of the superior explanations of the conflict. Meanwhile, Sousa agreed with the greed and grievance model but needed to add other factors such as leadership and external intervention (Sousa, 2016). Although there exist some critiques of Collier and Hoeffler's work, the greed-grievance model is an influencing model in explaining conflict and become one of the schools of thought in the discourse of conflict. Because of the greed explanation in particular, many world organizations and governments currently use an economic approach in conflict resolution.

In the development of ethnic conflict studies, experts later paid attention to the structure of society in terms of ethnicity. As ethnicity is regarded as a crucial factor, experts try to scrutinize such phenomena from the structure of ethnicity. The structure of ethnicity that is in the spotlight is ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization. Ethnic fractionalization is a concept "intended to capture the degree to which a society is split into distinct groups," while ethnic polarization is defined as "the sum of inter-personal 'antagonisms'. Antagonism results from the interplay of the sense of group identification (group size) and the sense of alienation with respect to members of other groups (inter-group distance)" (Esteban & Ray,

2008). Simply put, ethnic fractionalization refers to ethnic fragmentation into distinct ethnic groups, while ethnic polarization is the interplay between ethnic group size and inter-group distance.

Ethnic fractionalization is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, with the increasing diversity of ethnic groups in certain areas, the potential advantages of each ethnic group can contribute to the advancement of their village or community as a whole. Several studies show that the migration of ethnic groups or individuals with different ethnic backgrounds usually brings new work habits, professions, technology, capital, economic opportunities, hospitality, etc. to an area that was previously relatively homogeneous and underdeveloped, which could later considerably contribute to economic growth, variety of livelihood sources, increased income, tolerance, and so on (Sanjaya 2022; 2021; Ananta, 2023; Papyrakis & Mo, 2014). However, on the other hand, the more ethnic groups that interact, the greater the possibility of friction between ethnic groups, especially if there are no rules or institutions that regulate mechanisms for finding common ground on conflict resolution (Sanjaya et al., 2023; Wegenast) & Basedau, 2014; Python et al., 2017). Thus, despite the positive contribution of ethnic diversity, ethnic fractionalization could become an early “requirement” for the existence of potential conflict.

To better understand the potential conflict, studies of ethnic fractionalization need to be accompanied by studies of ethnic polarization (Koopmans & Schaeffer, 2015; Steele, 2022; Klasnja & Novta, 2016). Because ethnic polarization relates to poles of antagonism, competition, or contestation between ethnic groups, the higher the polarization, the higher the potential for conflict (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2002, 2005).

Many studies have been conducted on ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization at the global/international level and single country level, both concerning conflict or non-conflict (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2002; Esteban & Ray, 2008; Nissan & Naghshpour, 2013; Campos & Kuzeyev, 2015; Bleaney & Dimico, 2017; Shoup, 2018). Initially, researchers paid more attention to (economic) inequality and conflict, later shifted to ethnic fractionalization and conflict, and then to ethnic polarization and conflict (Easterly & Levine, 1997, Alesina et al., 2003; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban & Ray, 2008)

In Indonesia, however, the studies focus on linking ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization to ethnic diversity (Ananta et al., 2016), their relations with social capital (Mavridis, 2015; Sanjaya, 2022), expenditure inequality (Budi, 2020), migration and economic growth, economic development of certain areas (Ananta et al., 2023). So, in the Indonesian case, this work attempts to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization by focusing on ethnic conflict issues. There is a study on ethnic polarization and potential conflicts due to the new rice field plan policy (Pujiriyani, 2021), however, the study is a theoretical qualitative analysis attempting to assess potential conflicts in the planned areas of rice fields and does not use ethnic polarization index and empirical cases. This study attempts to fill this research gap in both thematic and methodological aspects.

To measure ethnic fractionalization and polarization, experts use statistical formulas to obtain the ethnic fractionalization index and ethnic polarization index (Ananta, 2016, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2002). By obtaining data on these two types of indices, it can be mapped which areas have high, low, or moderate potential conflict. Meanwhile, knowledge regarding potential conflict in a newly established government region can be acquired by observing that of the parent regions.

The questions in this research are, first, how large are the ethnic fractionalization index and ethnic polarization index in the two parent districts? Second, what do such indices mean in terms of potential ethnic conflict? Are the two parent districts conducive to providing ethnopolitical support for IKN development? By finding out the ethnic fractionalization index and ethnic polarization index in the two districts, this study has an objective to map the potential conflict or ethnic tension in the parent districts of the IKN area so that one can get a general picture of the condition of ethnicity in the IKN area and its surroundings. To map the position of fractionalization and ethnic polarization of these two districts at the provincial level, this article also tries to compare them with East Kalimantan Province which geographically hosts Kukar, PPU, and IKN.

2. METHOD

This research involves a quantitative approach using statistical formulas to analyze numerical data aiming at explaining the observed phenomena (Disman, 2017; Apuke, 2017) of ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization in the form of indices. The statistical formulas used to measure Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EFI) and Ethnic Polarization Index (EPOI) are as follows:

$$EFI_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^N s_{ij}^2 \quad \text{and} \quad EPOI_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^N \left(\frac{0.5 - s_{ij}}{0.5} \right)^2 s_{ij}$$

where EFI_j is Ethnic Fractionalization Index in the j region, $EPOI_j$ is Ethnic Polarization Index in the j region, and S_{ij} is the Proportion of ethnic group i ($i=1...N$) in the j region (Ananta, 2016; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2002; Alesina et al., 2003).

The scores of EFI and EPOI are scores with a range of 0 to 1. The detailed scale index of EFI and EPOI can be seen in Table 1 and will be used to assess the ethnic-demographic condition of the parent districts of the IKN area.

Table 1. Scale of Ethnic Fractionalization and Polarization Indices

No	Scale Index	Remarks
1.	0.00 - 0.05	Extremely low
2.	0.06 - 0.15	Very low
3.	0.16 - 0.25	Low
4.	0.26 - 0.35	Somewhat low
5.	0.36 - 0.45	Slightly low
6.	0.46 - 0.54	Moderate
7.	0.55 - 0.64	Slightly high
8.	0.65 - 0.74	Somewhat high
9.	0.75 - 0.84	High
10.	0.85 - 0.94	Very high
11.	0.95 - 1.00	Extremely high

Source: Based on an 11-point Likert scale. For the extreme points (e.g. $\geq 95\%$), see Arifin et al. (2014).

The data used is a dataset from the Central Bureau of Statistics/BPS (BPS microdata). As generally known, population censuses based on ethnicity were only carried out three times in Indonesia, namely in 1930 by the Dutch administration, and in 2000 and 2010 by BPS-Statistics Indonesia (Pitoyo & Triwahyudi, 2017). Ethnic sensitivity seems to be the main reason why population censuses based on ethnicity are no longer carried out in the 2020 population census and before 2000, especially during the New Order era. Academically, ethnic data is of importance for explaining social and political phenomena as well as helping make better policies.

Considering the most recent population census data based on ethnicity is the 2010 data, and the BPS micro data on ethnicity is only available for District/City-based data, this study has a limitation in providing updated data and in assessing the newly established IKN area as a single entity. However, although the population by ethnicity has certainly increased recently, the proportions of each ethnic group do not seem to have changed much. Furthermore, with the district/city-based data, one can examine the legacy condition of the parent districts of the IKN area aiming at roughly assessing the ethno-demographic condition of IKN.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Ethnicity in East Kalimantan

The population of East Kalimantan province according to the 2010 population census was 3.5 million people (Ananta et al., 2015). The 2010 population census was however carried out before the 2012 jurisdictional boundary realignment (*pemekaran*) of East Kalimantan Province to become East Kalimantan Province and North Kalimantan Province. To focus the analysis on ethnicity in East Kalimantan alone, the districts/cities that later belonged to North Kalimantan Province—Bulungan, Nunukan, Malinau, Tana Tidung, Tarakan—are excluded. With this exclusion, the remaining population of East Kalimantan at that time was 2.9 million people. It is important to note that the validity and relevance of using specific districts or cities and their associated data are taken into consideration. When comparing or tracing development, it is essential to ensure that the districts and cities being compared are the same for accurate apple-to-apple comparison. In the case of East Kalimantan, which currently has 10 districts/cities, the 2010 census data should be sourced from these 10 districts. Additionally, as time progresses, changes in population numbers will inevitably impact the ethnic population. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, the proportion of each ethnic group appears to remain relatively stable.

Based on the available most recent data, the number of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups—Ananta et al (2015) called this grouping “ethnic categories”—in East Kalimantan is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Number of Ethnic/Sub-Ethnic Groups in East Kalimantan

No	District/City	Number of Ethnic/Sub-Ethnic Groups	Remarks
1.	Paser	131	Total number of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in East Kalimantan is 434.
2.	North Penajam Paser	87	
3.	Balikpapan	217	
4.	East Kutai	151	
5.	Berau	144	Total number of ethnic groups alone in East Kalimantan is 274.
6.	Bontang	108	
7.	Samarinda	235	
8.	Kutai Kartanegara	168	
9-10.	West Kutai & Mahakam Ulu*	123	

Note: *The census was carried out in 2010 before the jurisdicative boundary realignment of West Kutai District into West Kutai District and Mahakam Ulu District in 2013.

Source: Calculated from BPS Population Census Dataset (2010).

Based on Table 2, the largest number of ethnic groups resided in Samarinda City (235 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups), which is then followed by Balikpapan City (217 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups). Meanwhile, North Penajam Paser District has the smallest number of ethnic groups (87 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups). By comparing ethno-demographic data of such districts/cities with that of East Kalimantan Province (434 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups), the data shows that many residents with the same ethnic background live in different districts/cities. Meanwhile, of the total 1333 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups (ethnic categories) found in Indonesia (Arifin et al., 2014), 32.56% of them reside in East Kalimantan. Of the total 633 ethnic groups (*kelompok suku*) living across the Indonesian archipelago (Arifin et al., 2014), 43.29% of them can be found in East Kalimantan. This means that nearly half of the number of ethnic groups in Indonesia can be found in East Kalimantan. In East Kalimantan, where there are a large number of ethnic groups, conflicts between different ethnic groups are quite common. The most common pattern of ethnic conflicts is between migrant ethnic groups and indigenous ethnic groups, such as the conflict between Buginese and Dayak in West Kutai and Berau, Buginese vs. Paser in PPU, Buginese vs. Tidung in Tarakan (when it was part of East Kalimantan), and Madurese vs. Paser in Paser. In the past, there was also conflict between migrant ethnic groups, especially between Buginese and Madurese in Balikpapan and Samarinda.

These ethnic conflicts are usually triggered by trivial and personal cases, such as beatings, stabbings, feeling offended, fighting, and personal revenge. However, when the victims, their friends, or families mobilize traditional resources in the form of ethnic solidarity, ethnic conflicts or ethnic riots become unavoidable and, in most cases, devastating. The population in East Kalimantan based on ethnicity and the ranking of the top 20 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Population of 434 Ethnic/Sub-Ethnic Groups in East Kalimantan

No	Ethnic Groups	Population	Percentage
1	Javanese	968,680	32.60
2	Buginese	555,619	18.70
3	Banjarese	415,435	13.98
4	Kutai	269,431	9.07
5	Toraja	64,305	2.16
6	Paser	54,632	1.84
7	Sundanese	49,518	1.67
8	Madurese	44,218	1.49
9	Dayak Tunjung	42,156	1.42
10	Butonese	38,434	1.29
11	Dayak Benuaq	36,055	1.21
12	Dayak Kenyah	27,714	0.93
13	Chinese	25,686	0.86
14	Makassarese	22,502	0.76
15	Berau/Merau	21,089	0.71
16	Mandar	20,900	0.70
17	Sasak	19,704	0.66
18	Dayak Bahau	18,837	0.63
19	Flores	18,706	0.63
20	Bajau	18,078	0.61
-	Others (414 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups)	239,506	8.06
Total		2,971,203	100.00

Source: Calculated from BPS Population Census Dataset (2010).

Based on Table 3, when ethnic groups and sub-ethnic groups are separated, of the 434 ethnic groups/sub-ethnic groups in East Kalimantan, the five biggest ethnic groups in terms of their population size are Javanese, Buginese, Banjareseese, Kutai, and Toraja. The native ethnic group is Kutai, while the others are a diaspora of ethnic groups from Java (Javanese), South Sulawesi (Buginese and Toraja), and South Kalimantan (Banjareseese).

If the sub-ethnic groups are grouped into their parent ethnic group, the results are 274 ethnic groups, whose population is broken down in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Population of 274 Ethnic Groups in East Kalimantan

No	Ethnic Groups	Population	Percentage
1	Javanese	968,680	32.60
2	Buginese	555,789	18.71
3	Banjarese	415,689	13.99
4	Kutai	269,431	9.07
5	Dayak	177,823	5.98
6	Paser	67,322	2.27
7	Toraja	64,305	2.16
8	Sundanese	49,518	1.67
9	Madurese	44,218	1.49
10	Butonese	38,434	1.29
11	Batak	31,798	1.07
12	Chinese	25,686	0.86
13	Makassarese	22,502	0.76
14	Berau/Merau	21,089	0.71
15	Mandar	20,900	0.70
16	Sasak	19,704	0.66
17	Flores	18,706	0.63
18	Bajau	18,078	0.61
19	Minahasa	17,121	0.58
20	Mamuju	11,280	0.38
-	Others (254 ethnic groups)	113,132	3.81
Total		2,971,203	100.00

Source: Calculated from BPS Population Census Dataset (2010).

By referring to Table 4, the configuration of the five major ethnic groups in East Kalimantan has changed; the ethnic rankings based on population are Javanese, Buginese, Banjareseese, Kutai, and Dayak. Of the five major ethnic groups in East Kalimantan, there are two native ethnic groups, namely Kutai and Dayak, while the other three ethnic groups (Javanese, Buginese, Banjareseese) are diaspora from ethnic groups in Java, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan.

Based on Tables 3 and 4, the top three ethnic groups however remained unchanged. They are the Javanese, Buginese, and Banjarese. These groups dominate the population for different reasons. The Javanese were initially brought in through a transmigration program that suited their talent in farming. Later, other fellow Javanese migrated on their own to seek jobs, economic opportunities, and a better future. The Buginese and Banjarese, on the other hand, are known for their trading skills, and their primary motivation to migrate to East Kalimantan was economic opportunities. The Buginese, in particular, looked for other jobs in various fields, including the government. This resulted in economic and political dominance of the Buginese in certain districts, leading to jealousy from other ethnic groups. Any minor incident could trigger ethnic conflict or riots.

Ethnicity in Kutai Kartanegara District

Kutai Kartanegara District is one of the parent districts of the IKN region. Based on the 2010 BPS dataset, the ethnic composition by ethnic group and sub-ethnic group in Kutai Kartanegara District is as follows (Table 5).

Table 5. The population of 168 Ethnic/Ethnic Groups in Kutai Kartanegara

No	Ethnic Groups	Population	Percentage
1	Javanese	177,685	28.72
2	Kutai	152,405	24.63
3	Buginese	115,450	18.66
4	Banjarese	78,194	12.64
5	Toraja	10,270	1.66
6	Sundanese	10,183	1.65
7	Dayak Kenyah	8,345	1.35
8	Dayak Tunjung	7,565	1.22
9	Madurese	6,881	1.11
10	Sasak	5,955	0.96
11	Mandar	5,141	0.83
12	Dayak Benuaq	3,632	0.59
13	Flores	2,720	0.44
14	Makassarese	2,718	0.44
15	Bima	2,608	0.42
16	Balinese	2,119	0.34
17	Butonese	1,711	0.28
18	Batak Karo	1,227	0.20
19	Minahasa	1,193	0.19
20	Paser	961	0.16
-	Others (148 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups)	21,805	3.52
Total		618,767	100.00

Source: Calculated from BPS Population Census Dataset (2010).

The above table shows that the five major ethnic groups in Kutai Kartanegara District are Javanese, Kutai, Buginese, Banjarese, and Toraja. The Kutai ethnic group is the only indigenous ethnic group in Kutai Kartanegara district in the ranking of the top five ethnic groups, while the others are ethnic groups whose native homeland is in Java (Javanese), South Sulawesi (Buginese and Toraja), and South Kalimantan (Banjarese).

By grouping the sub-ethnic groups into their parent ethnic group, the ranking order of the top 20 ethnic groups is presented in Table 6.

Table 6. The population of 109 Ethnic Groups in Kutai Kartanegara

No	Ethnic Groups	Population	Percentage
1	Javanese	177,685	28.72
2	Kutai	152,405	24.63
3	Buginese	115,460	18.66
4	Banjarese	78,194	12.64
5	Dayak	24,841	4.01
6	Toraja	10,270	1.66
7	Sundanese	10,183	1.65
8	Madurese	6,881	1.11
9	Sasak	5,955	0.96
10	Mandar	5,141	0.83
11	Batak	3,974	0.64
12	Flores	2,720	0.44
13	Makassarese	2,718	0.44
14	Bima	2,608	0.42
15	Balinese	2,119	0.34
16	Butonese	1,711	0.28
17	Minahasa	1,193	0.19
18	Paser	961	0.16
19	Ende	842	0.14
20	Minangkabau	805	0.13
-	Others (89 ethnic groups)	12,102	1.96
Total		618,767	100.00

Source: Calculated from BPS Population Census Dataset (2010).

Thus, when sub-ethnic groups are grouped into their parent ethnic group, the ranking of the top five ethnic groups in Kutai Kartanegara District (Kukar) has changed, where the indigenous ethnic groups

in the five major ethnic groups are Kutai and Dayak. The Kutai people however remain in second place after the Javanese in terms of population.

In the Kukar district, there are many areas where people from other regions come to live, known as transmigration areas. The majority of these transmigrants are Javanese. With the Javanese people's high mobility, many others from their homeland have been attracted to migrate to Kukar for better opportunities, particularly for work and a better life. As a result, the Javanese have become the largest ethnic group in Kukar.

Even though the number of Kutai people is second only to the Javanese, the Kutai people are considered the ethnic icons of this district. They used to be the people of the Kingdom/Sultanate of Kutai. Although the current Sultanate of Kutai Kartanagara no longer holds political power officially, the Kutai people and local government officials hold great respect for the current Sultan due to its position and role in the past and its current symbol as a unifying force among the Kukar people.

The Kutai officials, civil servants, and political leaders have prominent political networks, which allow this ethnic group to dominate the government and political spheres in this district.

Ethnicity in North Penajam Paser

As far as the ethno-demography of North Penajam Paser is concerned, the population of ethnic and ethnic groups in this district can be seen in Table 7.

Table 7. The population of 87 Ethnic/Sub-Ethnic Groups in North Penajam Paser

No	Ethnic & Sub-Ethnic Groups	Population	Percentage
1	Javanese	56,608	40.59
2	Buginese	37,124	26.62
3	Banjarese	11,458	8.22
4	Paser	11,094	7.95
5	Toraja	4,275	3.07
6	Sundanese	4,170	2.99
7	Mandar	2,449	1.76
8	Bajau	1,564	1.12
9	Sasak	1,342	0.96
10	Madurese	1,289	0.92
11	Mamuju	1,091	0.78
12	Flores	799	0.57
13	Makassarese	542	0.39
14	Minahasa	529	0.38
15	Butonese	529	0.38
16	Kutai	367	0.26
17	Minangkabau	344	0.25
18	Other ethnic/sub-ethnic groups of Kalimantan	221	0.16
19	Batak Toba	197	0.14
20	Duri	168	0.12
-	Others (67 ethnic & sub-ethnic groups)	3,307	2.37
Total		139,467	100.00

Source: Calculated from BPS Population Census Dataset (2010).

From Table 7, the population of the Paser ethnic group is ranked 4th, while ranks 2-3 are the Buginese and Banjarese. The Toraja ethnic group is ranked 5th. The Javanese make up the largest ethnic group in this district, comprising 40.59% of the total population.

According to District Regulation (*Perda*) of North Penajam Paser No. 2/2017 on the Preservation and Protection of Paser Traditions, "the Paser tribe, hereinafter referred to as Paser is an indigenous tribe (*suku asli*) of the people of North Penajam Paser District." This strong statement on ethnicity mentions that the indigenous people of the PPU district are a Paser ethnic group. During my interview with Paser activists in 2022, they emphasized such a particular article in the District Regulation. They said that indigeneity cannot be separated from land areas where they live. Within the boundary of PPU land areas, the native ethnic group is the Paser people. This means that other indigenous people of East Kalimantan like Dayak and Kutai are indigenous within the boundary of their land areas, which are in the West Kutai/Mahakam Ulu Districts and Kutai Kartanegara district respectively. This seems to rebut many new claims when other indigenous ethnic groups come to IKN and claim they are also indigenous ethnic groups there, particularly in the Sepaku sub-district area (Rings 1 and 2 of the IKN areas).

When sub-ethnic groups are grouped into their parent ethnic group, the results of the grouping in North Penajam Paser District are presented in Table 8.

Table 8. The Population of 63 Ethnic Groups in North Penajam Paser

No	Ethnic Groups	Population	Percentage
1	Javanese	56,608	40.59
2	Buginese	37,124	26.62
3	Banjarese	11,458	8.22
4	Paser	11,236	8.06
5	Toraja	4,275	3.07
6	Sundanese	4,170	2.99
7	Mandar	2,449	1.76
8	Bajau	1,564	1.12
9	Sasak	1,342	0.96
10	Madurese	1,289	0.92
11	Mamuju	1,091	0.78
12	Flores	799	0.57
13	Dayak	704	0.50
14	Batak	656	0.47
15	Makassarese	542	0.39
16	Minahasa	529	0.38
17	Butonese	529	0.38
18	Kutai	367	0.26
19	Minangkabau	344	0.25
20	Other ethnic/sub-ethnic groups of Kalimantan	221	0.16
-	Others (43 ethnic groups)	2,171	1.56
Total		139,467	100.00

Source: Calculated from BPS Population Census Dataset (2010).

Based on Table 8, it turns out that the ranking of major ethnic groups does not change even though the population size changes (for example, the Paser ethnic group). The top five ethnic groups are still Javanese, Buginese, Banjareese, Paser, and Toraja. Thus, the Paser ethnic group is still ranked 4th. This ranking order has certainly decreased compared to the past. It has been gradually decreasing from rank 1 (dominant group) in the past to rank 4 presently. In this regard, such aforementioned strong statement relates to this situation: worried about their fate in the future due to migration and a forthcoming exodus of people from Jakarta and elsewhere to IKN. Such a strong statement means that when the government tries to help the indigenous people of PPU who live in the IKN areas, the government should look at the Paser ethnic group.

Ethnic Fractionalization and Polarization in East Kalimantan, Kutai Kartanegara, and North Penajam Paser

By using EFI and EPOI statistical formulas on a dataset of all ethnic groups and sub-ethnic groups from BPS (summarized in Table 3-8), the ethnic fractionalization index (EFI) and ethnic polarization index (EPOI) in the two IKN parent districts, namely Kutai Kartanegara and North Penajam Paser Districts, can be obtained. To gain a more comprehensive understanding, the EFI and EPOI results in such two districts are compared with the EFI and EPOI results at the provincial level, namely East Kalimantan Province. The results are tabulated in Table 9.

Table 9. Ethnic Fractionalization & Polarization Indices in Kaltim, Kukar, and PPU

No	Index	East Kalimantan Province		Kutai Kartanegara District		North Penajam Paser District	
		N1=434	N2 = 274	N1= 168	N2 =109	N1 = 87	N2 = 63
1.	EFI	0.82852 (0,83) High	0.82513 (0,83) High	0.80477 (0,80) High	0.80349 (0,80) High	0.74870 (0,75) High	0.74850 (0,75) High
2.	EPOI	0.50711 (0,51) Moderate	0.51976 (0,52). Moderate	0.59232 (0,59) Slightly high	0.59720 (0,60) Slightly high	0.65777 (0,66) Somewhat high	0.65850 (0,66) Somewhat high

Note: - The index in brackets is the result of rounding

- N1 = Number of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups

- N2 = Number of ethnic groups

Source: Results of statistical calculations using the EFI and EPOI formulas

Referring to Table 9, the EFI calculation result in East Kalimantan for ethnic and sub-ethnic groups is 0.83. This shows that ethnic fractionalization in East Kalimantan is quite high. In other words, ethnic groups are highly fragmented. Meanwhile, ethnic polarization in East Kalimantan shows a figure of 0.51, which means the polarization is moderate. When the sub-ethnic groups are grouped into their parent ethnic group, the EFI and EPOI results are 0.83 and 0.52 respectively. This shows that the results are not much different. In other words, the difference is not significant when the EFI and EPOI formulas are applied to ethnic and sub-ethnic groups on the one hand and to ethnic groups only on the other hand.

As far as Kutai Kartanegara District is concerned, the ethnic fractionalization index is 0.80 while that of ethnic polarization is 0.59. This means that ethnic fractionalization is high while ethnic polarization is slightly high. If the EFI and EPOI are calculated based on ethnic groups only, the results are relatively the same or the difference is not significant (the index scores are 0.80 and 0.60 respectively). This score shows that Kukar's ethno-demographical condition is relatively conducive to supporting IKN development, given that its EPOI is closer to the moderate index figure.

Meanwhile, in North Penajam Paser District, the ethnic fractionalization index is 0.75 and the ethnic polarization index is 0.66, whether they are calculated based on the number of ethnic groups and sub-ethnic groups or on that of ethnic groups alone. With these results, fractionalization is also high while ethnic polarization is somewhat high. Thus, PPU's ethno-demographical condition lies somewhere between relatively conducive and alarming. This condition has "facilitated" ethnic riots in Penajam Sub-District in 2019. Ethnic tensions occurred between the indigenous ethnic group of Paser vis-à-vis the Buginese ethnic group originating from South Sulawesi.

If one compares the EPOI scores of three regions, East Kalimantan Province, Kutai Kartanegara District, and North Penajam District, one may wonder about the relationship between EPOI score and conflict. For example, why did more conflicts happen in the area with lower EPOI scores than in the area with higher scores? The reason for this is that East Kalimantan is at a different level of administrative government compared to the parent district of IKN, even though its ethnic polarization is lower. Ethnic polarization refers to the size of ethnic groups in a particular area. In a smaller area, the proportion of ethnic groups could be more significant. If there are only two ethnic groups of the same size in this smaller area, the ethnic polarization index will be maximum, that is 1. If there are three ethnic groups of the same size, the score will be around 0.88, and if there are four groups of the same size, the score will be around 0.75. If the size of this ethnic dominance is brought to a higher level, such as the provincial level, its proportion would decrease, and so would its ethnic polarization. This is what happens in East Kalimantan compared to such parent districts. Additionally, the East Kalimantan polarization score is at the provincial level. In this context, ethnic conflicts could occur in certain areas in East Kalimantan (in districts or cities), depending on the condition of its sub-areas and the developing situation. However, with such a moderate score it is less likely, if not unlikely, that the conflicts would become conflicts at a provincial level (trans-district conflicts), as in the case of West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan (de Jonge & Nooteboom, 2006; Kristianus, 2022; Nadzifah, 2022).

This study has presented and analyzed ethno-demographic data of the parent districts of the IKN area. The findings show that ethnic fractionalization is higher in Kukar than in PPU, indicating that the ethnic condition in Kukar is more fragmented than that of PPU. On the other hand, ethnic polarization is higher in PPU than in Kukar, which means that potential conflict in PPU is higher than in Kukar. In simpler terms, the risks of ethnic conflict in PPU are higher than in Kukar. This is supported by the empirical evidence that PPU experienced ethnic conflict in the form of ethnic riots, while Kukar did not observe any such conflict.

There has been growing research on ethnic fractionalization, ethnic polarization, and conflict. Some research tried to link ethnic fractionalization and conflict. However, with empirical cases their results are ambiguous. Esteban & Ray (2008) later said that "most of the literature fails to find any significant evidence of ethnic fractionalization as a determinant of conflict." Ethnic fractionalization may be important for economic growth, innovation, the introduction of new professions, cultural tourism, and so on, but questionable for conflict. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol later attempted to measure ethnic polarization quantitatively based on the RQ Index (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2002), and through empirical cases, they found a significant relationship between ethnic polarization and conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). They further argued that "the measure of ethnic heterogeneity appropriate to capture potential conflict should be a polarization measure." Following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, it is suggested that areas with higher ethnic polarization tend to experience more ethnic conflicts. Or, the risk of ethnic violence is higher in areas with a higher polarization index. This study confirms Montalvo and Reynal-Querol's findings in that ethnic polarization is more responsible for ethnic conflict than ethnic fractionalization. Ethnic fractionalization in PPU (0.75) is lower than that of Kukar (0.80), and the ethnic polarization in PPU (0.66) is higher than that of Kukar (0.59-0.60). Ethnic conflict occurred in PPU.

However, in areas where ethnic polarization is high, conflicts may or may not occur. This is because ethnic polarization refers to the potential or risk of ethnic conflicts. In this regard, researchers warn that ethnic polarization only shows the potential for conflict, where the risk of conflicts is higher in a more polarized society. To turn this potential or risk into reality, various other things should be taken into consideration, such as the educational level, history of previous conflicts, ethnic stereotypes, ethnic relations, economic and political conditions, and so on. Nevertheless, the ethnic fractionalization index and ethnic polarization index are “two important indices that can help [make] better social, economic, and political policies” (Ananta et al, 2016). The elaboration below highlights the most important points on why conflict occurred in PPU but not in Kukar.

In North Penajam Paser, the five largest ethnic groups are Javanese (40.59%), Buginese (26.62%), Banjarese (8.22%), Paser (8.06%), and Toraja (3.07%). In this district, ethnic conflict between Paser vs. Buginese ethnic groups did occur in 2019 around the Penajam ferry port areas. First, the ethnic polarization score of 0.66 is somewhat high (closer to a high index), which indicates that ethnic tensions are shared by the largest ethnic groups, particularly the Paser and Buginese ethnic groups. Second, why didn't the Buginese come into conflict with the Javanese, who are the main “rival” in terms of ethnic group size? This is because Javanese migrants—and also the Banjarese and Toraja ethnic groups—are known as ethnic groups that like to give in (*mengalah*) to avoid confrontation. Meanwhile, the Buginese have been known to have had several conflicts with indigenous ethnic groups in several areas in East Kalimantan: with the Dayak ethnic groups in West Kutai, with the Paser ethnic group in PPU, with the Tidung ethnic group in Tarakan (when Tarakan still belonged to East Kalimantan). Wekke et al. (2019) compared the Buginese and Madurese which have many similarities on the positive side, such as hard work, talent in business, honesty, and strong self-esteem. However, there are also negative stereotypes of the Buginese, such as feeling superior, rude, short-tempered, tough, and violent (cf. Juditha, 2015; Arswendi, 2015; Hudriati, 2020). The Bugis people who have migrated from Sulawesi and lived for a long time in East Kalimantan are generally the same as other ethnic groups who try to avoid conflict. What generally causes problems are the Buginese youths who have just come to East Kalimantan to look for jobs, and who are not very familiar with the customs and traditions of the place where they live. The problem is, although the conflict was initiated by young people, ethnic solidarity is strong, hence involving older Buginese people as in the case of the Tarakan ethnic conflict.

Why was the native Paser ethnic group in conflict with the Buginese ethnic group although they adhered to the same religion? This can be traced from the position of the Paser ethnic group in the North Penajam Paser district. Although according to the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN), the Bajau ethnic group is also an indigenous ethnic group in North Penajam Paser (Nugroho, 2022), as aforementioned, District Regulation of North Penajam Paser No. 2/2017 only mentioned the Paser ethnic group as an indigenous ethnic group in this district. With this regulation, the indigenous Paser ethnic group is perceived as having special privileges or positions compared to other ethnic groups.

Conditions in the field are different, particularly its socioeconomic and ethnopolitical conditions. The economy around Ferry Port was dominated by the Buginese. The Buginese who have talent in trading and business, dominated most of the economic activities in this area. Most shops, kiosks, boats, and transportation services are owned by the Buginese. The Paser people cannot compete with the Buginese in this matter, as their main talent is in dry farming. At the district level, most government position is dominated by the Buginese. PPU politics is divided along ethnic lines where the Buginese dominate the political sphere in PPU. These economic and ethnopolitical inequalities heightened the polarization. When an ethnic group with a special position or privilege is disturbed and faces a different reality from their expectation, this ethnic group will tend to show its ethnic group power (cf. Kovacic & Zoli, 2021) by mobilizing ethnic solidarity across the district so that ethnic tensions and ethnic riots cannot be avoided. The Penajam ethnic riots were triggered by the death of a Paser youth due to a quarrel over the noisy exhaust sound. Ethnic solidarity arose and ethnic mobilization occurred across North Penajam Paser district. As the tension increased due to the burning of Buginese houses and other properties, Buginese residents fled across the sea to Balikpapan by several boats and to other areas by land transportation. In Balikpapan, dozens of boats with Buginese passengers were ready to cross the Balikpapan Bay to Penajam ferry port to fight. However, because the security forces blocked all land and sea transportation, the conflict did not escalate.

In Kutai Kartanegara, the five largest ethnic groups are Javanese (28.72%), Kutai (24.63%), Buginese (18.66%), Banjarese (12.64%), and Dayak (4.01%). In the author's observations, there have never been any incidents of ethnic riots or ethnic conflicts in the Kutai Kartanegara district. First, although its polarization score of 0.59-0.60 is classified as slightly high, this category is closer to the moderate category. Second, ethnic conflict in East Kalimantan is definitely between native ethnic groups and migrant ethnic groups, except in the Samarinda and Balikpapan conflicts between the Buginese and Madurese gangs in the

1980s and 1990s (de Jonge & Nootboom, 2006). Migrant Javanese and Banjarese ethnic groups in East Kalimantan are known as low-profile ethnic groups and try to avoid confrontation. For the native ethnic group, the native Kutai ethnic group is also known as the ethnic group that prefers to avoid confrontation. In the modern era, the role of the Kutai Sultanate is of importance as all Kutai people still respect the “central command” of the current Sultan whose peace ideology is well known. Moreover, with the position as the second largest ethnic group as well as the domination of Kutai people in local politics and government, ethnic resentments are absent. Thus, there is no reason for confrontation. In some parts of East Kalimantan, the Dayak ethnic group has had conflicts with the Bugines ethnic group. However, in the Kutai Kartanegara district, they coexist and no ethnic conflicts have been reported.

During the West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan conflict between Dayak and Madurese, the Madurese in East Kalimantan has also become the target (de Jonge & Nootboom, 2006), but because of leaders of ethnic groups and the pro-active government of East Kalimantan, some incidents can be prevented. So it is worth noting this ethnic group in this context. In West and Central Kalimantan, the Madurese have more negative stereotypes than positive ones, such as rude, violent, short-tempered, macho-like, rude, uncivilized, unfair, avaricious, revengeful, hardly adapted to their new social environment, looked down on others, and easy to kill (Murdianto, 2018; de Jonge & Nootboom, 2006). The stereotypes create prejudices. Resistance among Madurese then arises in response to such stereotypes and prejudices. Triggered by a trivial case, as the Madurese population is considerable in West and Central Kalimantan, the resistance was then expressed openly, hence, open conflict became unavoidable. In Kutai Kartanegara district, however, the Madurese population is only 1.11% of the total population. Although the stereotypes against the Madurese ethnic group may be different in Kutai Kartanegara, its population size as well as traumatic mass violence against the Madurese in West and Central Kalimantan (de Jonge & Nootboom, 2006), seemingly forces the Madurese to take a low-profile path in Kutai Kartanegara. Ethnic conflicts between the native ethnic groups (Kutai and Dayak) and the Madurese have been absent in the Kutai Kartanegara district.

In short, to assess the likelihood of conflict or its potential conflict, it is crucial to consider ethnic polarization rather than ethnic fractionalization. The Ethnic Polarization Index (EPOI) can be used to measure this potential. A higher score of ethnic polarisation is a reminder or a warning that the risks of ethnic conflict are higher. However, for potential conflicts to turn into reality, as in the case of PPU, certain factors such as ethnic stereotypes, political and economic inequality, and a trigger come into play.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The parent districts of the IKN area, namely North Penajam Paser and Kutai Kartanegara, are home to diverse ethnic groups. This has resulted in high ethnic fractionalization in these two districts. However, the potential for conflict is more related to ethnic polarization. In PPU, ethnic polarization is higher than in Kukar, meaning the risks of conflict are higher in PPU than in Kukar. This is proven by the ethnic riots that have occurred in PPU. Overall, the condition of ethnopolitics in Kutai Kartanegara is relatively conducive to providing support for the IKN development. In North Penajam Paser, its ethno-demographical condition lies somewhere between relatively conducive and alarming. Considering the socio-political condition, the ethnopolitical climate in North Penajam Paser appears favorable for supporting the development of IKN. However, it is crucial to pay serious attention to the issue of indigenous Paser people in the IKN area, as they represent a considerable population, being the third largest ethnic group in the Sepaku subdistrict, which includes Rings 1 and 2 of the IKN areas.

To ensure a peaceful and humane development of IKN, it is highly recommended to pay more attention to the indigenous people and ethnic relations. Better socio-cultural, economic, and political policies should be implemented to take care of the Paser ethnic group and prepare them to face the forthcoming technologically advanced capital city. This will help prevent the mobilization of local “ethnonationalism” and ensure a smooth and sustainable development of IKN.

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